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ǮBeyond the lootǯ 
Social disorder and urban unrest 
 
Deborah Platts-Fowler, University of Leeds 
 
 
Abstract 
The article looks at current explanations for the 2011 English riots. It 
critiques one dominant view that, beyond the micro-political protest in 
Tottenham, people primarily participated to loot lifestyle items they could 
not afford to buy. Empirical data is used to challenge the extent and nature 
of the looting in 2011, concluding that the proportion of riot events that 
were not focused on looting, directly contradicts the argument that 
criminal acquisition and consumerism were primary drivers of the unrest. 
Social disorder is more likely to manifest as looting in commercial areas, 
but it does not naturally follow that participants originally set out to loot, 
and economics may not be their primary motive. The article moves on to 
explore the role the police may have played in promoting Ǯcontagionǯ and 
to reflect on the role of policing in preventing and limiting unrest, even 
where foregrounded by other precipitating factors.  
 
Key Words: 2011 English riots; urban disorder; looting; consumerism; 
policing 
 
 
Introduction 
 
This paper outlines emergent explanations for the English 2011 
disturbances, looking in more detail at those which claim they were mainly 
about the loot. The Government and a group of criminologists believe that, 
beyond the initial protest in Tottenham over the police killing of Mark 
Duggan, people took part in the disorders primarily for motives of greed and material gain. The Government suggests this was Ǯcriminality, pure and simpleǯ ȋCameron, ʹͲͳͳȌ, while the criminologists argue that the 
overpowering influence of consumerist ideology was the major cause. 
The paper draws on empirical data to challenge key assumptions 
about the extent and nature of the looting in 2011, and refers to accounts of 
previous disturbances - in Britain, France and the United States - to 
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demonstrate that looting can have other purposes beyond the economic. 
Comparative analysis is then used to demonstrate how, across time and 
space, policing has played a more important role in fostering urban unrest, and may be responsible for the Ǯcontagionǯ in ʹͲͳͳ. Findings revealing the 
dynamic relationship between policing and unrest are then used to reflect 
on ways in which the police can prevent and limit disorder in 
contemporary urban settings.  
 
A criminal underclass 
 
For four days in August 2011 there were widespread public disturbances in 
66 locations across England and Wales. Generally referred to as 'riots', they 
involved an estimated 15,000 people, cost five lives and approximately half 
a billion pounds (Bridges, 2012). Despite the scale of these disturbances, 
there has been no major official inquiry. David Cameron claimed "this was 
not political protest or a riot about protest, about politics. It was common 
or garden thieving, robbing and looting. And we don't need an inquiry to 
tell us that" (cited in Newburn et al., 2011b). 
The idea of the disturbances as a product of a 'Broken Britain' 
emerged strongly in the Government's commentary on the riots. This was a 
theme used by Cameron before the riots in justifying the agenda of the 
Coalition Government (Solomos, 2011), and afterwards to distance the 
events from any policies introduced by his administration, constructing 
them instead as the product of moral breakdown (ibid). The usual culprits 
cited as responsible for this breakdown were feral children whose parents 
had failed in their duty to socialise them, and criminal gangs. This political 
response was echoed by Australian sociologist, John Carroll (2012), who 
suggests the disturbances were a symptom of the Ǯspoilt brat mentalityǯ 
that had developed in Britain and parts of Europe. He links this to welfare 
dependency, which has undermined the natural role of authority figures to 
transmit cultural beliefs and expectations down to new generations. 
 
Social injustice 
 
In the UK, a number of academics have argued that advanced capitalism 
and neo-liberal policies have created a highly unequal society, producing 
marginalised groups who are angry and feel their only way to express this 
is through violent outburst. Lea and Hallsworth (2012) suggest the 2011 
disturbances were an expression of this 'diffuse and generalised rage', which had no specific target ȋp.͵ͳȌ. Others regard them as an Ǯuprisingǯ 
against the perceived injustices of the state and other powerful elites (e.g. 
Newburn et al., 2011b; Wain and Joyce, 2012). 
Milburn (2012: 402) suggests that the 2011 disturbances emerged from a Ǯcontext of crisis and austerity'. European data demonstrates that 
social unrest is invariably linked to recession, in anticipation of austerity 
measures rather than their felt effects, because in the majority of cases 
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unrest narrowly precedes the cutbacks (Ponticelli and Voth, 2009). This fits 
the situation in 2011, when the full weight of proposed spending cuts had 
not yet hit. 
Taylor-Gooby (2013: 12) argues 'it is not so much the fact of cut-backs … as the groups affected and the detail of the restructuring of the 
welfare state' that affects social order. Welfare cuts that hit the poorest 
groups hardest, and welfare restructuring that promotes a greater role for 
the private over the public sector, are most likely to undermine legitimacy 
(the extent to which citizens accept the authority of the Government), and 
in doing so are the most likely to promote social unrest. 
Young people, representing approximately half of riot participants 
(Ministry of Justice, 2012), had already been hit particularly hard by 
economic decline and austerity measures. Youth unemployment had 
reached record levels, and cuts to youth provision had left some young 
people with little to do (Higgs, 2011; McVeigh, 2011; Wain and Joyce, 
2012). Rioters interviewed for the Reading the Riots study invariably 
talked about a pervasive sense of injustice, with younger interviewees 
particularly likely to mention lack of opportunities, cuts, and the ending of 
the Educational Maintenance Allowance1 (Newburn et al., 2011a).  
The close proximity of disparities in wealth is one factor explaining 
why similarly deprived areas were unaffected. In London, where a great 
deal of the unrest occurred, the rich and poor live side-by-side (Stenson, ʹͲͳʹȌ and the Ǯstatus frustrationǯ induced by this is palpable ȋAngel, ʹͲͳʹȌ. 
Jeffery and Jackson (2012) refer to the highly visible disparities in Salford, 
where 'islands of gentrified affluenceǯ exist Ǯin a sea of relative poverty'. 
These emerged under the banner of urban regeneration (ibid), but are actually the Ǯresult of a free and politically uncontrolled play of market forcesǯ where the poor are excluded from city centres in a bid to attract 
inward investment and appeal to wealthy consumers (Bauman, 2012: 12). 
Thus, a significant dimension to the disturbances was the struggle over 
place and belonging (Spalek et al., 2012; Jeffery and Jackson, 2012).  
 
Over-policing 
 
Empirical evidence spotlights anger at the police as a key motivation for 
some riot participants. Adversarial styles of policing, such as stop-and-
search, are widely reported to promote defiance rather than compliance 
(Sherman, 1993). Of those brought before the courts for riot-related 
offences, 78 per cent of males and 43 per of females had been stopped and 
searched in the previous year (Topping et al., 2011). It emerged that not 
only was the quantity of stop-and-searches an issue, but the disrespectful 
manner in which they were carried out (Reicher and Stott, 2011). 
Consequently, some participants claimed to have rejected opportunities to 
loot during the disturbances, to focus on the police (Lewis, 2011). These 
                                                 
1 Financial aid payable to young people aged 16-19, studying or undertaking unpaid work-
based learning, where parents have a certain level of taxable income. 
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findings highlight the importance of policing grounded on principles of Ǯprocedural justiceǯ ȋsee (ough, ʹͲͳ͵Ȍ. 
Although Whites represented the largest group in the disturbances, Solomos ȋʹͲͳͳ: ʹȌ suggests that Ǯit would be wrong to leave to one side the 
role that ... race and ethnicity played in some localities'. Some Black rioters 
report feeling unfairly treated by the police because of their race (Muir and 
Adegoke, 2011). There is also the remarkable similarity between the events 
surrounding the shooting of Duggan, and the role this played in sparking 
the riots, and the events that led to the Broadwater Farm riots of 1985, 
following the death of Cynthia Jarratt, who died during a police search of 
her home. Despite policing reforms since the urban disorders of the 1980s, 
it seems that policing practices may not always be sensitive to the needs of 
ethnically diverse communities. 
 
Bad behaviour 
 
Newburn (2012b) suggests that criminologists are not unaware of 
'techniques of neutralisation' and have been enormously careful both in 
interviewing and analysis to weigh carefully what rioters have said, 
'retaining a researcher's necessary scepticism at all times' (p.334). 
Nevertheless, there remains a great deal of suspicion that riot participants 
were simply making excuses for bad behaviour ( Treadwell et al., 2012; 
Waddington, 201ʹ; Žižek, ʹͲͳͳȌ. According to Žižek ȋʹͲͳͳ: ͵Ȍ: 
 
It's easy to imagine a protester who, caught looting and burning a 
store and pressed for his reasons, would answer in the language 
used by social workers and sociologists. 
 
We are reminded of the inconvenient truth that disorder and rioting are fun 
(Rock, 1981). Some of the events were observed as being carnivalesque 
(Waddington, 2012). A proportion of participants offered no other 
motivation for their involvement than 'the buzz of doing things they 
couldn't or wouldn't normally do such as smashing things and being chased 
by the police' (Morrell et al., 2011: 27). The motivation of having 
'something exciting to do' is likely linked to the everyday boredom 
experienced by some groups of young people, due to high youth 
unemployment and a lack of quality youth provision (Morrell et al., 2011). 
Boredom may have been heightened anyway, in August, due to the school 
summer holidays. 
 
Consumerism 
 
There is a group of criminologists and sociologists (Bauman, 2012; Moxon, 
201ͳ; Tester, ʹͲͳʹ; Treadwell et al., ʹͲͳʹ; Žižek, ʹͲͳͳȌ who agree with 
Cameron, that the 2011 disturbances were primarily about robbing and 
looting, for material gain and not politics. They claim that despite 
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everything else - the relative poverty, unemployment, austerity and loss of 
youth provision – people participated because they felt unable to let this 
historic opportunity to grab something for free pass them by (Treadwell et 
al., 2012).  
In contrast to the Government view, that family disintegration and 
the poor socialisation of children promoted the looting, these academics 
regard it as a product of the successful integration and socialisation of 
young people into a society that values wealth and consumables above all 
else. Rioters may have been angry and dissatisfied with their lot, but they Ǯdid not begrudge the super-rich their successǯ ȋibid, pͳͲȌ. They wanted the same for themselves. ǮThe ubiquity of the consumerist motivation is 
revealed by the fact that, after selling the goods they had stolen, they returned to the same stores to buy legitimate goodsǯ ȋibid, p.͸Ȍ. (ence, Ǯthis was not a rebellion or an uprising… but a mutiny of defective and disqualified consumersǯ ȋBauman, ʹͲͳʹ: ͳͳȌ. The police were 
only attacked because they got in the way of the shopping experience 
(Tester, 2012). The political context is recognised, but only to explain the 
impossibility of protest due to a culture of individualism, envy and intense 
social competition produced by late-capitalism and neoliberalism - which 
has made it Ǯalmost impossible for a potential collective of marginalised 
subjects to construct a universal political narrative that makes causal and 
contextual sense of their own shared suffering and offers a feasible solution to itǯ ȋTreadwell et al., ʹͲͳʹ: ͵Ȍ.  
 
Scale and nature of looting 
 
None of the explanations so far have really looked at the scale and nature of 
looting in 2011. Based on The Guardian (2011) database of riot incidents 
(collated from a range of media sources including news reports, blogs and twitterȌ and the authorǯs own categorisation of these – according to 
whether they were primarily about looting, criminal damage, conflict (with 
the police), or general disorder – it seems that looting was not as prevalent 
as many accounts suggest. The data indicates that two-thirds of riot 
incidents had little or nothing to do with looting (fig 1), and, in some local 
authority areas, looting accounted for less than a tenth of what occurred 
(fig 2). This database does not capture every public order incident, but 
more detailed analysis of events in Nottingham suggests that looting 
incidents are over-represented. 
These findings undermine the explanatory power of personal greed 
or consumerism. The majority of riot participants were not thieving or Ǯshoppingǯ. The data confirms what many participants have claimed, that a proportion was more intent on Ǯsticking it to the policeǯ. This fits with the 
observations made by Davies (2012) during the Birmingham disorders, 
where '[t]heir only aim was to goad the police, challenging them vocally, 
attempting to provoke the police to charge', at which point they would run 
through side streets to escape, before returning to repeat the exercise till 
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late into the night (p.16). There is also the fact that, in Nottingham, five 
police stations were attacked (One Nottingham, 2011), which does not fit 
easily with the consumerist thesis. 
 
Figure 1. 2011 Riot incidents by primary category, nationally 
 
Data source: The Guardian (2011) 
 
 
Figure 2. 2011 Riot incidents by primary category, by district 
(districts where ten or more incidents were recorded) 
 
Data source: The Guardian (2011) 
 
The role of looting in 2011 may have been exaggerated due to the 
value of the goods taken. Campbell (1993) suggests that damage to and 
looting of shops was a key feature in the Meadowell riot, in Northumbria, in 
1991. Yet, the looting there, which left the people of Meadowell without 
access to basic provisions for a long time afterwards, received rather less 
attention. One wonders whether this was because the looting here amounted to little more than stockpiles of shampoo and coffee in riotersǯ 
homes (ibid), rather than plasma televisions. 
Mac Ginty ȋʹͲͲͶȌ suggests that Ǯlootingǯ is a pejorative term. )t is a 
negative label used by the powerful, usually to imply acts of criminal 
acquisition motivated by greed. This is the definition accepted within the 
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consumerism thesis. Yet, looting conflates a wide range of activities that 
can differ greatly in terms of organisation, scale and the object of looting. 
To counter the indiscriminate use of the term, Mac Ginty proposes a four-
fold typology, which establishes that in addition to economic motives, 
looting can be symbolic, strategic, or selective. 
Symbolic looting includes the taking of goods as trophies, fitting 
with some accounts that looting in 2011 was primarily used as a means to 
acquire street reputation, especially by those involved in gangs, and this 
took primacy over the material value of looted goods (Harding, 2012). 
Looting can also send a message about changing power relations, 
demonstrating a lack of consent for existing authority. This aligns with Angelǯs ȋʹͲͳʹȌ view that riots are inherently political events because they 
both provoke and are a product of what Habermas (1975) describes as a Ǯlegitimation crisisǯ, where the modern state, in its attempts to maintain 
profitability in a capitalist-based economy, fails to retain political 
legitimacy in the eyes of its citizens. 
Collins (2008) has previously referred to the strategic role of 
looting, which can act as a 'mass recruiter and momentum sustainerǯ, 
without which the riot would come to an end once the police chose to 
withdraw. From a Durkeimian perspective, looting is a 'symbolic 
expression of membership' (McDonald, 2012). Solidarity and integration 
was evident in the looting behaviour in 2011. Participants stood in the way 
of cameras, presumably to avoid fellow looters being identified, Looters 
taking goods from other looters was reported, but rare, and violence was 
generally targeted at non-participants (ibid).  
Selective looting, often a feature of communal rioting, is where 
properties or whole areas are looted in a manner suggesting target 
discrimination. For example, in the 1992 Los Angeles riot, property damage 
for Koreans was disproportionately high (Min, 1996: 90), being targeted by 
African Americans due to long simmering tensions linked to cultural 
differences and the socio-economic success of Korean Americans relative to 
blacks (Kim, 2011). Advocates of greed and consumerist explanations 
might see the targeting of designer clothing and electrical stores in the 
2011 riots as simple economics. An alternative explanation, voiced by 
looters themselves, is that these stores were targeted because they were 
perceived to be the most exploitative (Briggs, 2012). 
Mac Ginty (2004) has identified four variables that must come 
together for looting to occur:  
 
1. availability of potential looters 
2. availability of lootable goods 
3. absence of restraint 
4. permissible socio-cultural environment 
 
These factors focus on the circumstances in which looting takes place, over the characteristics or motivations of offenders, which is how the Ǯroutine activity approachǯ seeks to explain crime ȋsee Cohen and Felson, ͳͻ͹ͻȌ. The 
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second variable spotlights the importance of place, suggesting that looting 
is more likely to occur where lootable goods are more easily available, such 
as commercial areas; and may explain the greater prevalence of looting in 
some places compared to others. 
Quantitative research in the U.S. has shown that where there has 
been no pre-arrangement or planned event, people tend to gather at 
symbolic locations, such as a well-known public building or major road 
intersection (Haddock and Polsby, 1994). Arguably, a shopping centre is a Ǯsymbolic locationǯ for young people living in contemporary urban Britain. Shopping centres are where young people meet to Ǯhang outǯ with their 
friends. Hence, it is understandable that young people living in Birmingham 
should head to the Bull Ring shopping centre, where disorder occurred in 
2011. The manifestation of looting here is perhaps unsurprising given the 
proximity of lootable goods, but it does not confirm that participants 
gathered with prior intention to loot. 
 
Policing preventing unrest 
 
The disorder in 2011 is believed to have been triggered when a young 
woman, protesting outside Tottenham Police Station, was pushed to the 
ground and hit repeatedly by a police officer. Some say this event, rather 
than the death of Duggan, 'sparked' the disturbances (Reicher and Stott, 
2011), thus, demonstrating the importance of strategies and techniques to 
effectively manage gatherings, to prevent them turning into major unrest.  
People gather for many reasons, some simply as curious onlookers, 
but motivations can change, affected by the behaviour of other people at 
the gathering (McPhail and Wohlstein, 1983; McPhail, 1994). Research in 
the U.S. (Perez et al., 2003) has shown that the presence of a sizable, well-
trained police force has a deterrent effect on riot escalation, whereas the 
violent deployment of the same officers has the opposite effect. The 
elaborated social identity model (ESIM) (see Drury and Reicher, 2000) 
explains how this can happen. Homogenous treatment of the crowd creates 
a common experience, promoting group identification and group 
behaviour. Once unified, an action against one member of the group is 
perceived as an action against the whole group. Collective conflict is more 
likely where the police-civilian encounter gives rise to a shared sense of 
police illegitimacy (Reicher et al., 2007). 
Some areas of the country are reported to have avoided 
disturbances in 2011 specifically linked to the approaches taken by the 
police. In the St Pauls district of Bristol, the police had gained experience 
during the 'Tesco riots' earlier the same year. As a result they were Ǯvery 
firm but very even-handedǯ calling on people to 'calm down', which had a 
relaxing effect on an otherwise tense crowd (Clifton, 2012b). Police arrests 
in the imminent or early stages of unrest, of people deemed to be doing 
little wrong by their peers, become symbolic of a society that treats them 
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unjustly. This was the situation that played out in Ely, Cardiff, leading to 
unrest in the early 1990s (Campbell, 1993).  
Research has found that crowds are neither apolitical nor 
ahistorical, and that greater levels of excessive force are especially 
problematic where foregrounded with poor police-community relations 
(Perez et al., 2003; Rosenfeld, 1997). For example, the Chicago Bulls Riot of 
1992 was widely defined as a Ǯcelebratory riotǯ because it started as a 
celebration of a basketball victory. Rosenfeld (1997), however, evidences that it was political as well as celebratory, responding to a Ǯreservoir of grievancesǯ including massive welfare cuts in )llinois and the televised 
drama of the Los Angeles riot of 1992, linked to the police beating of 
Rodney King. This demonstrates how an understanding of riots must focus 
on precipitating events and longer-term underlying causes. 
There are usually signs that unrest is imminent before it erupts. 
Preceding the unrest in Oldham in 2001, the Asian community, expecting 
trouble after a football match, asked the police to re-direct fans from their 
area of residence. Had the police responded, the unrest might have been 
avoided (Bagguley and Hussain, 2008). Instead, Asian men gathered to 
defend the community themselves, leading to a large-scale confrontation. 
The police managed to drive back the White football fans and then 
attempted to disperse the Asians, who assumed that the police were taking the fansǯ side. The main disturbances that took place a few weeks later, 
characterised by extensive Asian violence against the police, were undoubtedly affected by these events. Thus, highlighting how Ǯunder-policingǯ, as well as over-policing, can contribute to the breakdown of social 
order. 
Historical accounts demonstrate that a proactive approach by the 
police, with local partners, can prevent violence. Campbell (1993) describes 
how the joint efforts of the police and the Racial Equality Committee (REC) 
managed to avoid major unrest on the Elswick estate, Newcastle, in the 
early 1990s, by mobilising to protect the symbolic sites of its Asian 
residents, who were at risk of being targeted. The choice of policing 
partners seems important. In Chapeltown, Leeds, major unrest was averted 
in 2011 by the decision of West Yorkshire police to allow long-standing and 
respected community workers to conduct urgent outreach with potential 
rioters (Clifton, 2012a). As recognised in the HMIC review (2011), Ǯgood community engagementǯ is Ǯpivotalǯ in effectively policing disorders ȋp.͸ͲȌ; 
however, officers themselves may not always be the best placed to engage 
directly, depending on the situation and groups involved.  
Communication and transparency are important factors in 
preventing disorder. In the absence of any announcement from the 
Metropolitan Police Service (MPS) or the Independent Police Complaints Commission ȋ)PCCȌ confirming or denying the Ǯexchange of fireǯ or Ǯassassinationǯ stories circulating in the press, Duggan's family and the 
community began to suspect police mishandling. The MPS review (2012) notes that inaccuracies in these media stories Ǯshould have been positively 
rebutted immediately'. Had they been, people may not have gathered 
Papers from the British Criminology Conference, Vol. 13 
26 
outside Tottenham police station seeking information and answers. Again, 
the paucity of information, when no senior officer came to speak to the 
gathering, took events further towards unrest. Violence finally erupted 
when the police addressed the crowd not with information, but with force. 
 
Policing limiting unrest 
 
A perception that the police could not contain the scale of the rioting was 
reported as a factor contributing to the spread of the disturbances. People 
felt they 'would be able to loot and damage without being challenged by the 
police' (Riots Communities and Victims Panel, 2011). One reason suggested 
for why the disturbances came to end was fear when the numbers of police 
officers on the street began to swell (Taylor et al., 2011). This supports Ǯrational choice theoryǯ and an understanding of riotersǯ, who decide 
whether to participate based on perceived costs and benefits. It converges with Jobardǯs ȋʹͲͲͻȌ explanation for contagion in the ʹͲͲͷ French riots, 
which he suggests was due to an initial policing strategy focusing on 
containment rather than arrest, as Sarkozy attempted to avoid any incident 
of police brutality that might undermine his government. 
It is not wholly clear why the MPS did not take control when the 
2011 disturbances began. The MPS reported being unprepared as unrest 
spread to 22 of London's 32 boroughs (Newburn and Prasad, 2012). 
Officers dealing with the violence first-hand said they felt not only 
unprepared, but untrained for the situation, overwhelmed and afraid (ibid). 
Perez et al. (2003) argue that a well-trained police force is crucial for 
dealing with unrest, due to the potentially disastrous outcomes that may stem from a single officerǯs transgressions toward a member of the public. 
They propose training officers to manage their emotions as well as the crowds they confront. Riots, such as the Watts riot of ͳͻ͸ͷ, Ǯmight well 
have been averted had the officers ignored taunts and insults from an angry yet innocuous crowd.ǯ ȋPerez et al., 2003: 177). 
Doubts remain whether the British police could have dealt any 
better with the 2011 disturbances, even with more and better trained 
officers. It is suggested that low morale, linked to job insecurity and recent 
controversies had undermined police resolve (Angel, 2012). In the 
aftermath of the Tomlinson case2, it is unclear whether a strategic decision 
had been made not to confront the crowds, risking another incident of 
police brutality. Officers did, however, report being more cautious about 
the level of force they used as a consequence (Newburn, 2012a). 
Prioritising the protection of life over law enforcement would have been 
supported by Lord Scarman, who conducted the inquiry into the 1981 
Brixton riots, even if he would have been critical of some of the other police 
failures regarding community engagement (ibid). 
                                                 
2 A newspaper vendor, who died after being struck by police at the 2009 G20 protests 
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A report by the HMIC (2011) proposed that a new framework for 
resolving public disorder should include the rules of engagement for 
weaponry such as water cannons, CS gas, and plastic bullets. The Home 
Affairs Committee (2011), however, concluded that these would have been 
an inappropriate and dangerous response to events in 2011. However well-
equipped the police force, society would still be impossible to regulate 
without its consent (Jackson et al., 2012; Klein, 2012). People are more 
likely to obey the law and cooperate with the police where there is moral 
alignment between the people, the law and enforcement agencies (Jackson 
et al., 2012; Tyler and Fagan, 2006). In the words of Chief Constable Alderson, following the ͳͻͺͲsǯ disturbances, the way forward is 'to talk 
hearts and minds, not CS gas and plastic bullets' (cited in Wain and Joyce 
2012: 133). 
Durodié (2012) claims that what was exposed by the 2011 
disturbances was a crisis of authority, and authorities needed to work out 
how to inspire their citizens to be part of and engage with their own 
society. Research evidence supports this, reporting that a major brake on the disturbances was not any particular policing tactic, but the Ǯcall for peaceǯ from the father of one of the men killed in Birmingham. Rioters 
commented how the father's public speech made them feel remorseful, and 
this directly informed their decision to exit from the disturbances (Taylor 
et al., 2011). Parental pressure and concerns about bringing shame on their families were also found to inhibit young peopleǯs involvement ȋMorrell et 
al., 2011; Taylor et al., 2011). This demonstrates that communities have the 
ability to self-regulate, and perhaps suggests a role for the police as 'facilitators… rather than creators' of social order (Innes and Roberts, 
2008). 
 
Conclusion 
 
Unrest is usually foregrounded by social inequality, social injustices 
perpetrated by the state, business, or the police, and often the context of 
austerity. Protest against these seems to be a motivation for some rioters. There is also the Ǯgeneralisedǯ anger of marginalised groups, who know not 
what to blame. However, a lack of understanding about the structural and 
processual causes of their suffering does not make political action 
impossible. Perhaps their actions are Ǯpoliticalǯ if they are rioting because 
something is definitely not right. Either way, the large-scale breakdown of 
social order is a political context.  
There is evidence that some people took part in the 2011 
disturbances for personal and material gain. However, the number of riot 
events that did not involve looting directly undermines the argument that 
criminal acquisition was the primary driver of unrest. Capitalist and 
consumerist ideologies undoubtedly influence many aspects of our 
behaviour, but clearly other factors were at play. It must also be recognised 
that looting can have non-economic motives. For example, with the police 
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looking on, unable to prevent it, looting can be a show of power that is 
overtly political. 
There is significant evidence demonstrating the role of the police in 
fostering and limiting unrest. Treating people uniformly as a crowd, using 
unfair practices, can transform a gathering into a riot. Low police numbers 
in the early stages of unrest, using methods of containment rather than 
arrest, has also been found to escalate disorder, as marginalised and over-
policed groups seize a rare opportunity to feel powerful.  
However, even in unequal societies, police and policing partners 
have the potential to prevent and limit disorder by monitoring and 
proactively responding to tensions and by fostering good police-
community relations, supported by sensitive community liaison and 
transparency. Styles of policing that treat people with respect ensure trust 
in the institution of policing and provide a better platform for maintaining 
social order over the longer term (see Hough, 2013). 
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